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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature 
that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear 
relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with 
corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels 
of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives 
and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of 
the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain 
the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n this study, we examine CEO compensation incentives as one determinant of corporate tax avoidance. 
Prior studies regarding the effects of executive compensation incentives on tax avoidance generally find 
a positive relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance (Hanlon, Mills & 
Slemrod, 2005; Minnick & Noga, 2010; Rego & Wilson, 2012). They argue that executive compensation incentives 
improve the alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, thereby encouraging managers to engage in 
tax avoidance activities that increase firm value. On the other hand, several studies find no or negative relation between 
executive equity incentives and tax avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker 2012). 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) posit that executive compensation incentives reduce managerial opportunism, thereby 
discouraging the manager’s tax avoidance activities that are in complementary relationship with managerial 
opportunism. Also, a recent paper by Armstrong et al. (2012) finds no association between CEO compensation 
incentives and tax avoidance. To provide a possible answer for these mixed empirical results regarding the effect of 
CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance, this study examines the linearity of the relationship between 
CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. 
 
Prior studies examining the effect of executive compensation incentives on tax avoidance consistently assume that 
compensation incentives help align the incentives of managers with shareholders. However, these studies do not 
consider the possibility that compensation incentives may actually make managerial incentives diverge from those of 
shareholders’ because high level of compensation incentives exacerbates manager’s exposure to firm risk, leading to 
decreased risk tolerance. As the manager makes decisions based on his or her personal risk tolerance which is lower 
than those of other shareholders, the manager may take insufficient risk from the shareholders’ perspective 
(Hölmstrom 1979; Amihud & Lev 1981; Hirshleifer & Suh 1992; Low 2009). In a tax strategy setting, as managers 
have personal concerns about the risk of being challenged by the IRS and the resulting punishment or reputational 
damage (Hanlon & Slemrod 2009; Boone, Khurana & Raman 2013), managers with high compensation incentives 
may reject risky tax avoidance strategies that have positive net present value. 
 
I 
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Hence, executive compensation incentives have two opposing effects on tax avoidance decisions. On one hand, 
compensation incentives encourage a manager to engage in tax avoidance activities that produce a sufficient increase 
in firm value (the incentive alignment effect). On the other hand, compensation incentives may reduce corporate tax 
avoidance as large equity incentives may discourage the manager from taking risky tax avoidance strategies (the risk 
reducing effect). These two opposing effects may help explain why prior research finds mixed evidence on the 
relationship between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance. 
 
We expect CEO compensation incentives to exhibit a “hump-shaped” relation with corporate tax avoidance. At low 
levels of incentives, we expect a positive relation between compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance 
because CEO’s own stake on the additional value due to tax savings increases with compensation incentives. However, 
at high levels of incentives, we expect a negative relation between compensation incentives and corporate tax 
avoidance because large equity incentives exacerbate manager’s insufficient risk taking problem (Low 2009; Hayes, 
Lemmon & Qiu 2012). A manager’s utility loss due to the incremental risk from tax avoidance activities increases 
with the level of compensation incentives, whereas his utility gain due to the incremental firm value decreases with 
the level of compensation incentives. Therefore, beyond a certain level of compensation incentives, the negative risk 
reducing effect is expected to subsume the positive incentive alignment effect. Furthermore, large stock ownership 
gives a manager sufficient voting rights that protect him from disciplinary penalties when he makes suboptimal risk 
choices from the shareholders’ perspective (Kim & Lu 2011). In sum, we expect that the relationship between CEO 
compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance is non-linear with both positive and negative associations. 
 
We further test for the non-linear relation using a subsample of S&P500 firms. One of the risk factors of aggressive 
tax strategy is reputational risk. According to Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff (2014), publicly traded companies, 
larger companies, and more profitable companies are significantly more concerned about the adverse reputational 
consequences of tax planning. S&P500 firms, above being large in size and likely being profitable, are also under 
greater news coverage. As S&P500 firms are more likely to have high ex-ante reputational concerns, we expect those 
firms to engage in lower level of risky tax avoidance, and thus the non-linear relation to be diminished.  
 
The contributions of this study are: First, the findings of this study add to the literature on the relation between 
managers’ compensation incentives and tax avoidance. Specifically, we show that the positive incentive effect is 
overturned at high levels of compensation incentives because excessive stakes on the company entrenches a manager 
and causes him or her to reject value-enhancing tax strategies. Our findings of the hump-shaped relation may explain 
why prior research that assumes a monotonic relation finds mixed evidence on this issue. Second, we provide empirical 
support for the theory stating that the high compensation incentives magnifies manager’s insufficient risk-taking 
problem. Although the theory has been suggested by extant research (Hölmstrom, 1979; Low, 2009), empirical 
findings are relatively scarce on the issue (Kim & Lu, 2011). We add to the literature by exploiting the discretionary 
and risky characteristics of tax avoidance activities. Third, whereas numerous studies attempt to find the reasons for 
the “under-sheltering puzzle”, this study contributes to the literature by documenting that effective tax rates increase 
beyond a certain level of CEO incentives. By showing that the non-linear relation fades out for firms with greater 
reputational risk (i.e., S&P500 firms), our study may be interpreted as providing an indirect evidence of the 
reputational concerns deterring tax avoidance activities. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review related studies and develop our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 presents the main results, and Section 5 offers an additional analysis. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Executive Incentives as a Determinant of Firms’ Tax Avoidance 
 
In their survey paper, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) point out that corporate tax strategies can be in large part 
influenced by managerial incentives of a firm. Where there have emerged papers searching for the relation between 
executive incentives and corporate tax avoidance, the results thus far are not consistent (Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer 
& Larcker, 2015). In this section, we review papers that examine executive incentives as one determinant of corporate 
tax avoidance. 
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Hanlon et al. (2005) examine corporate characteristics regarding tax noncompliance firms and document a positive 
association between pay-for-performance sensitivity and a chance of a firm to be challenged by the IRS. This result 
can be interpreted as higher pay-for-performance sensitivity leading to more aggressive tax planning. In a following 
study, Minnick and Noga (2010) directly test the relation between pay-for-performance sensitivity and tax avoidance, 
and demonstrate that a one-unit increase in CEO pay-performance-sensitivity reduces GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) 
by 0.541% and cash ETR by 0.571%. The paper demonstrates that high pay-performance-sensitivity alleviates agency 
conflict and induces managers to choose tax strategies that lead to long-term value enhancement. As equity incentives 
are provided with the objective of aligning the incentives of managers to those of shareholders, it is reasonable to 
expect that greater compensation incentives lead managers to be more aggressive about increasing the bottom-line 
income through tax avoidance.  
 
On the other hand, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find negative association between compensation incentives and the 
level of tax avoidance. They suggest that managers of firms with high level of tax avoidance can use the complex 
nature of tax sheltering to engage in managerial diversion. As the level of compensation incentives becomes higher, 
managerial incentives are better aligned with the shareholders, as thus the managers reduce opportunistic tax 
sheltering, which result in lower levels of tax avoidance. There is also an empirical study that finds no association 
between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. Armstrong et al. (2012) searches for the 
association between CEO incentives and the level of tax avoidance but fails to find a significant relation between the 
two.  
 
Overall, although many prior studies examine the relationship between executive compensation incentives and firms’ 
tax avoidance, the results thus far are not consistent. Certain papers show a positive association, whereas others show 
a negative or no association. In this study, we attempt to reconcile the mixed results by introducing a non-linear 
property of the relationship.  
 
CEO Incentives, Risk Taking, and Tax Avoidance 
 
Recent literature on corporate tax avoidance views aggressive tax planning as one type of risk-taking activities. The 
risk of taking aggressive tax strategies include not only potential challenges by tax authorities, but also reputational 
penalties when public acknowledges the engagement in aggressive tax strategies. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) examine 
the stock price reaction of firms accused of engaging in tax shelters, and find evidence of adverse price reaction 
following public revelation of aggressive tax strategies. Rego and Wilson (2012) state that a one standard deviation 
increase in CEO equity risk incentives decreases cash ETR by 16.6%, suggesting that equity risk incentives encourage 
CEOs to undertake more aggressive tax avoidance strategies that entail risk. 
 
Boone et al. (2013) demonstrate that under the separation of ownership and control, managers may be risk-averse, and 
with personal concerns on detection and penalties, take less tax risk. They show that because higher levels of religiosity 
are expected to be associated with higher levels of risk-aversion (Hilary & Hui, 2009), higher levels of religiosity 
leads to less risky tax positions, thereby leading to lower tax avoidance.  
 
Armstrong, Blouin Larcker and Taylor (2013) note that the sensitivity of a CEO's equity portfolio to changes in stock 
price “amplifies the effect of equity risk on the total riskiness of the manager’s portfolio, generally discouraging risk-
averse managers from taking risky projects.” Armstrong et al. (2015) later interpret this finding that CEO’s equity 
compensation can possibly lead to lower level of tax avoidance under the situation that the tax avoidance strategy 
entails risk. In summary, it is widely accepted that aggressive tax planning can be viewed as one type of risk-taking 
activities. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
As summarized in the previous section, prior literature shows conflicting results on whether managers’ stock-based 
compensation incentives should lower or raise corporate tax avoidance. While the results of prior studies vary, these 
studies consistently assume that compensation incentives help align the incentives of managers with those of 
shareholders, thereby encouraging the managers to determine the level of tax avoidance to increase stock price and 
firm value. However, compensation incentives may actually make managerial incentives diverge from those of 
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shareholders because compensation incentives exacerbate the manager’s exposure to firm risk, and reduce his or her 
risk-tolerance (Hölmstrom, 1979). As a result, from the shareholders’ perspective, the manager may take insufficient 
risk because he makes decisions based on his own risk preference which is more conservative than those of other 
shareholders (Hölmstrom, 1979; Low, 2009). In a tax strategy setting, Slemrod (2004) suggests that shareholders 
expect managers to utilize all tax strategies that will lead to increase firm value, but under the separation of ownership 
and control, managers may be risk-averse and take less tax risk. In particular, with excessively high stakes on the firm, 
managers have personal concerns about the risk of IRS detection and the resulting punishment, and thus take a less 
aggressive tax position (Boone et al., 2013). This risk-reducing effect under high compensation incentives may lead 
to lower corporate tax avoidance. With the above reasoning, it is reasonable to expect that over the spectrum of CEO 
compensation incentives, managers with high stakes on the firm are more likely to take less risk compared to managers 
with low stakes on the firm.  
 
We hypothesize that two contradicting effects of managerial incentives will drive a non-linear relationship between 
CEO compensation incentives and tax avoidance; one being an incentive alignment effect, and the other being a risk-
reducing effect. Specifically, at low levels of incentives, we expect a positive relationship between compensation 
incentives and corporate tax avoidance because CEO’s own stake of the additional value due to tax savings increases 
with compensation incentives. However, at high levels of incentives, we expect a negative relationship between 
compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance because large equity incentives exacerbate manager’s 
insufficient risk taking problem (Low, 2009; Hayes et al., 2012). A manager’s utility loss due to the incremental risk 
from tax avoidance activities increases with the level of incentives, whereas his utility gain due to the incremental 
firm value decreases with the level of incentives. Therefore, beyond a certain level of compensation incentives, the 
negative risk reducing effect will subsume the positive incentive alignment effect. Large stock ownership also gives 
a manager sufficient voting rights that protect him from disciplinary penalties when she makes suboptimal risk choices 
from the shareholders’ perspective (Kim & Lu, 2011). Accordingly, we formally state our main hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis: The relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance will exhibit a hump-
shape. 
 
Specifically, we expect CEO compensation incentives to exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at 
low levels of incentives and a negative relation at high levels of incentives. Recent paper by Armstrong et al. (2015) 
states that if the expected benefit of aggressive tax positions exceeds the expected costs, the relation between CEO 
compensation incentives and tax avoidance will be positive. However, if the tax strategy entails sufficient risk, then 
the relation is likely to be negative. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the strength of corporate governance should 
help explain the relative size of the expected costs and expected benefits of tax avoidance. Whereas Armstrong et al. 
(2015) conjecture a differential association between corporate governance and tax avoidance in the extreme levels of 
tax avoidance, our paper hypothesizes a differential association between CEO compensation incentives and tax 
avoidance in the high levels of compensation incentives. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Measures of Tax Avoidance  
 
For the measurement of corporate tax avoidance, we use several measures that are widely used in the literature: long-
run cash effective tax rates, book-tax differences, and discretionary permanent book-tax differences. The first measure, 
long-run cash effective tax rates (CASH_ETR), is calculated as the ratio of the three-year sum of cash taxes paid to the 
three-year sum of pre-tax book income. Higher values of cash ETR reflect lower tax avoidance. To be consistent with 
the signs of other tax avoidance measures, we multiply the cash effective tax rate by minus 1. The second measure, 
book-tax difference (BTD), is the difference between book income and estimated taxable income, measured as pre-
tax income minus the sum of grossed up current federal and foreign tax expense. Higher values of BTD reflect higher 
tax avoidance. The third measure, discretionary permanent book-tax-differences (DTAX), is the unexplained portion 
of the permanent book-tax-differences. Higher values of DTAX reflect higher tax avoidance and it is documented to 
be reflecting tax shelter involvement (Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009). See Appendix A for details on measurement. 
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Corporate tax avoidance strategies include not only the illegal tax evasion strategies but also the legal tax avoidance 
strategies and differentiating between the two can be obscure (Slemrod, 2004). Whereas CASH_ETR or BTD measures 
both the level of legal tax avoidance and the level of aggressive (risky) tax avoidance, conceptually, DTAX captures 
tax avoidance activities that are in the more aggressive end of the tax avoidance continuum (McGuire, Omer & Wang, 
2012). Our study predicts a nonlinear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and tax avoidance using an 
explanation of both incentive alignment effect and risk-reducing effect. While the incentive alignment effect in the low 
CEO incentive zone predicts increased tax avoidance that may either be legal or risky, the risk-reducing effect predicts 
reduced tax strategies that entail risk. Therefore, we expect that the hypothesized hump-shaped relationship is tested 
more appropriately with the CASH_ETR or BTD measure, as opposed to the risky tax avoidance measure, DTAX. 
 
Research Design 
 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
 
TAXAVOIDi,t  = β0 + β1 CEO_INC i,t + β2 (CEO_INC)2 i,t + β3 VEGA i,t + β4 SIZE i,t 
+ β5 LEV i,t + β6 FI i,t + β7 PPE i,t + β8 CAP_EXPi,t + β9 R&D i,t + β10 MB i,t 
+ β11 ROA i,t + β12 NOL i,t + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + ε i,t  (1) 
 
where TAXAVOIDi,t is the three measures (CASH_ETR, BTD, and DTAX) discussed above; CEO_INC i,t is measured 
as the log of the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio; (CEO_INC)2i,t is included to reflect any non-linear 
relation between CEO_INCi,t and TAXAVOIDi,t; VEGAi,t is the sensitivity of the change in wealth associated with a 
1% change in stock return volatility; SIZEi,t is the log of total assets; LEVi,t is the leverage measured as the sum of 
long-term debt and short-term liability scaled by lagged assets; FIi,t is the foreign income scaled by lagged assets; 
PPEi,t is the plant, property, and equipment scaled by lagged assets; CAP_EXPi,t is the capital expenditures scaled by 
the plant, property, and equipment; R&Di,t is the R&D expenditures scaled by lagged assets; MBi,t is the market-to-
book ratio measured as market value of equity, scaled by book value of equity; ROAi,t is the return on assets measured 
as operating income scaled by lagged assets; and NOLi,t is the indicator variable for net operating loss carry-forwards. 
 
The main variables of interest in this paper are CEO_INC and (CEO_INC)2. If a hump-shaped relation exists between 
CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance, β1 will show a positive sign, whereas β2 will show a 
negative sign. VEGA is included to control for CEO’s risk incentives that can affect corporate tax avoidance. SIZE, 
LEV, and FI are included to control for firm characteristics reported in prior literature to be correlated with corporate 
tax avoidance (Rego 2003; Frank et al. 2009). PPE, CAP_EXP, and R&D are included to capture differences in book 
and tax reporting that can affect the tax avoidance measure (Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin 2010). We also control 
for firm growth (proxied by MB) as growth firms are more likely to invest in assets that are given favourable tax 
treatments. Finally, we control for firm profitability (ROA) and net operating loss carry-forwards (NOL) to proxy for 
firms’ tax saving needs (Rego, 2003; Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010). For all regressions, we include year and 
industry dummies to control for fixed effects. 
 
DATA AND EMPIRCAL RESULTS 
 
Data 
 
We construct a sample of US firms from 1992 through 2010 using accounting data provided in Compustat. In using 
the CEO compensation incentive measure, we use the definition and data provided by Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2013) to minimize potential measurement error, and to be consistent with other studies.1 
 
We require each firm-year observation to have all necessary data for use in regression equation. However, if a firm 
has missing values of R&D expenditures, we replace the missing values with zero to preserve data. We remove 
observations with total assets less than $1 million and also exclude firms in the financial service industries and in the 
                                                
1 Coles et al. (2013) provide the data on CEO compensation incentive measures – delta (pay-performance sensitivity) and vega (risk-taking 
incentives) for the period 1992-2010 on their websites. 
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utility sector. Lastly, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This procedure yields a 
final sample of 13,364 CEO-year observations. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the regression analysis. The mean (and median) 
value of CASH_ETR is -0.27, which is consistent with the distributional properties reported in Rego and Wilson 
(2012). The mean (and median) value of BTD is 0.02, which is consistent with the non-family firm BTDs reported in 
Chen et al. (2010). Although DTAX is calculated as the residual from cross-sectional regressions, it is not zero as it is 
first calculated with the Compustat variables and then matched with the compensation data. Table 1 also shows that 
sample firms are on average profitable with mean (median) ROA of 0.13 (0.11), and make relatively low mean and 
median capital (CAP_EXP) and R&D (RND) expenditures. We also note that 33 percent of the sample firms report an 
NOL carry forward. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
(N=13,364) Mean Std Dev Percentiles 
25th Median 75th 
CASH_ETR -0.27  0.13  -0.35 -0.27  -0.19   
BTD 0.02  0.06  0.00  0.02  0.04  
DTAX 0.01  0.08  -0.01  0.01  0.03  
CEO_INC 3.03  1.34  2.08  2.95  3.88  
VEGA 0.11  0.15  0.02  0.05  0.13  
SIZE 7.23  1.41  6.21  7.10  8.14  
LEV 0.22  0.19  0.05  0.20  0.33  
FI 0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.03  
PPE 0.30  0.24  0.12  0.24  0.42  
CAP_EXP 0.07  0.06  0.03  0.05  0.08  
RND 0.03  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.04  
MB 3.68  57.25  1.71  2.50  3.81  
ROA 0.13  0.09  0.07  0.11  0.17  
NOL 0.33  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Notes: See Appendix A for details on measurement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for CASH_ETR, 
which is truncated at -1 and 0. 
 
 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients among tax avoidance measures, CEO compensation incentives, and 
other control variables. As expected for different tax avoidance measures, CASH_ETR, BTD, and DTAX are all 
positively correlated with each other. Correlation coefficients between CEO_INC and both CASH_ETR and BTD show 
a positive sign, which is in line with the incentive alignment effect. Correlation between CEO_INC and DTAX lacks 
statistical significance.  
 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlations between Tax Avoidance, CEO compensation incentives, and Other Control Variables 
 CASH  
ETR BTD DTAX 
CEO_ 
INC VEGA SIZE LEV FI PPE 
CAP_ 
EXP RND MB 
PT_ 
ROA NOL 
CASH_ETR  0.25 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.14 
BTD   0.13 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.10 
DTAX    0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 
CEO_INC     0.38 0.26 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.33 0.26 -0.03 
VEGA      0.52 0.05 0.18 -0.06 -0.11 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.10 
SIZE       0.29 0.15 0.10 -0.12 -0.17 -0.02 -0.24 0.13 
LEV        -0.07 0.24 0.02 -0.24 -0.05 -0.25 0.05 
FI         -0.10 -0.05 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.13 
PPE          0.70 -0.23 -0.04 0.00 -0.12 
CAP_EXP           -0.03 0.10 0.24 -0.13 
RND            0.20 0.15 0.07 
MB             0.54 -0.05 
PT_ROA              -0.14 
Notes: See Appendix A for details on measurement. Bold indicates significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. 
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Empirical Results 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the regression analysis of our hypothesis using CASH_ETR as a measurement 
variable for TAXAVOID. Column (1) shows the result without (CEO_INC)2, thereby assuming a linear relation 
between CEO compensation incentives and tax avoidance. The result shows that the coefficient on CEO_INC has a 
positive sign, which is in support of the incentive alignment effect, but lacks statistical significance. On the contrary, 
Column (2) shows that when (CEO_INC)2 is included as an explanatory variable, the coefficients on CEO_INC and 
(CEO_INC)2 become significantly positive and negative, respectively, each at the 1% level. This finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the relation between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance is hump-
shaped. Looking at the control variables, the coefficient on VEGA shows a positive sign, which is consistent with 
Rego and Wilson (2012), demonstrating that equity risk incentives increase the level of tax avoidance. Also, the result 
suggests that firms with net operating loss (NOL) and larger foreign income and capital expenditures (FI and 
CAP_EXP) have higher tax avoidance. 
 
Columns (3) to (6) show the results using BTD and DTAX as tax avoidance measures, and the implications are 
consistent with the results in Columns (1) and (2). First, Columns (3) and (5) show that when the (CEO_INC)2 term 
is excluded from the regression, the coefficients on CEO_INC are insignificant. However, when (CEO_INC)2 is 
included in the regression, the coefficients on CEO_INC become significantly positive and the coefficients on 
(CEO_INC)2 become significantly negative, which represents the hump-shaped relationship between CEO 
compensation incentives and the two tax avoidance measures, BTD and DTAX [Column (4) for BTD and Column (6) 
for DTAX]. As expected, the significance level decreases when DTAX is used as a tax avoidance measure. This finding 
is consistent with the measurement construct that DTAX is expected to capture only the risky component of the tax 
avoidance strategy, whereas CASH_ETR and BTD are expected to capture overall (from perfectly legal to risky) tax 
avoidance activities.  
 
In sum, the results suggest that tax avoidance increases below a certain threshold of CEO compensation incentives 
and then decreases. This is consistent with our hypothesis that two different forces, the incentive alignment effect and 
the risk reducing effect, induce the relationship between CEO compensation incentives and the level of tax avoidance 
to be non-linear. In other words, under low levels of incentives, a positive relation exists between CEO compensation 
incentives and corporate tax avoidance because CEO’s share of the incremental value due to tax savings increases 
with compensation incentives (i.e. the incentive alignment effect). However, at high levels of incentives, a negative 
relation exists between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance because large equity incentives 
exacerbate manager’s insufficient risk taking problem. Specifically, the result suggests that at high levels of incentives, 
the risk of reputational penalties or potential adverse market reaction induces CEOs to take less risky tax avoidance 
strategy (i.e. the risk reducing effect). 
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Table 3. Examination of the relation between tax avoidance and CEO compensation incentives 
 Dependent Variable 
CASH_ETR BTD DTAX 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.309
***  -0.323***  0.004  -0.001  -0.029***  -0.033***  
(-25.34) (-25.34) (0.68) (-0.17) (-3.90) (-4.25) 
CEO_INC 0.001  0.013
***  0.000  0.004***  0.000  0.003 * 
(1.21) (3.95) (0.61) (2.88)  (1.79) 
(CEO_INC)²  -0.002
***   -0.0006***   -0.0005*  
 (-3.76)   (-2.83)  -1.800  
VEGA 0.033
***  0.032 *** 0.006  0.006  0.008  0.008  
(3.61) (3.54) (1.54) (1.49) (1.40) (1.37) 
SIZE 0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  (1.56) (1.27) (-0.88) (-1.09) (-0.80) (-0.93) 
LEV 0.046 
*** 0.045 *** 0.011  0.011  -0.001  -0.002  
(7.29) (7.11) (4.12) (3.99) (-0.32) (-0.40) 
FI 0.108 
*** 0.108***  0.157***  0.157***  0.230***  0.230***  
(2.81) (2.81) (9.61) (9.61) (9.85) (9.85) 
PPE 0.074 
*** 0.075***  0.032***  0.032***  0.010**  0.011 ** 
(9.21) (9.31) (9.32) (9.39) (2.12) (2.16) 
CAP_EXP 0.085 
*** 0.085***  0.019  0.019  -0.011  -0.011  
(3.05) (3.03) (1.59) (1.58) (-0.66) (-0.67) 
RND 0.296
***  0.295***  -0.055***  -0.056 *** 0.019  0.018  
(9.75) (9.70) (-4.29) (-4.33) (1.01) (0.99) 
MB 0.002
***  0.002  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  
(3.22) (3.26) (0.76) (0.79) (-1.41) (-1.39) 
ROA -0.007  -0.010  0.115
***  0.114***  -0.041***  -0.042***  
(-0.44) (-0.62) (17.45) (17.29) (-4.35) (-4.44) 
NOL 0.020 
*** 0.020***  0.011***  0.011***  0.002  0.002  
(8.23) (8.19) (10.93) (10.90) (1.23) (1.21) 
N 13,364 13,364 13,364 13,364 13,364 13,364 
Adj. R²(%) 11.9  12.0  9.7  9.8 5.9 6.0  
Notes: All regressions control for year and two-digit SIC industry codes. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this paper, the major driving force leading to a potential non-linear relationship is the risk-reducing effect under the 
high CEO incentive zone. The risk of taking a tax avoidance strategy includes the probability of detection and the 
resulting punishment (penalties) as well as the potential reputational risk leading to a stock price discount. In a recent 
survey paper by Graham et al. (2014), 69 percent of executives have rated reputational risk as being an important 
factor deterring them from adopting a potential tax planning strategy. However, when Gallemore, Maydew and 
Thornock (2014) conduct an empirical test using 113 firms that were subject to public scrutiny of tax shelter 
engagements, they find no evidence of an adverse reputational effect. In a following paper, Graham et al. (2014) note 
that empirical studies focusing on firms’ reputational concerns cannot account for the possibility that ex ante 
reputational concerns may deter firms from engaging in tax shelter activities.  
 
According to Graham et al. (2014), publicly traded companies, larger companies, and more profitable companies are 
significantly more concerned about the adverse reputational consequences of tax planning. As firms with high 
reputational concerns should, ex-ante, be engaging in less risky tax avoidance activities, we expect the nonlinear 
relation between CEO incentives and tax avoidance to diminish for S&P500 firms, which are large in size, likely being 
profitable, and under greater news coverage. If S&P500 firms with greater reputational concerns are engaging in less 
risky tax avoidance strategy, it is likely that they have limited capacity to cut back on their tax avoidance strategies as 
their compensation incentives increase. Therefore, we expect that the non-linear relation between CEO incentives and 
tax avoidance will diminish or weaken for the subsample of S&P500 firms. 
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Panel A of Table 4 reports the subsample results for the S&P500 firm-years. For brevity, we have not reported the 
coefficients for other control variables. Regardless of tax avoidance measures, we confirm that the statistical 
significance on both the CEO_INC and (CEO_INC)2 have disappeared for S&P500 firms, which are likely to face 
greater ex-ante reputational risk. In contrast, Panel B of Table 4, which excludes the S&P500 firm-years from the total 
sample, shows a result consistent with that in Table 3, suggesting that the non-linear relationship between CEO 
incentives and tax avoidance is derived mostly by non-S&P500 firms. 
 
 
Table 4. Subsample analyses for S&P 500 firm-years and non-S&P 500 firm-years 
Panel A. S&P500 firm-years 
 Sign Dependent Variable (1) CASH_ETR (2) BTD (3) DTAX 
Intercept  -0.320
*** -0.017 -0.023 
 (-14.13) (-1.59) (-1.21) 
CEO_INC + 0.010 0.005 -0.001  (1.40) (1.50) (-0.12) 
(CEO_INC)2 - -0.001 -0.0007
* 0.0001 
 -1.050 (-1.70) (0.11) 
N  3,230 3,230 3,230 
 
Panel B. Non-S&P500 firm-years 
Intercept  -0.379
*** -0.005 -0.015** 
 (-31.23) (-0.97) (-2.29) 
CEO_INC + 0.014
*** 0.004*** 0.005 ** 
 (3.70) (2.69) (2.17) 
(CEO_INC)2 - -0.002
*** -0.0006** -0.0006** 
 (-3.49) (-2.40) (-1.97) 
N  10,134 10,134 10,134 
Notes: All regressions control for year and two-digit SIC industry codes. Regressions include the following control variables, VEGA, SIZE, LEV, 
FI, PPE, CAP_EXP, RND, MB, ROA, and NOL variables, which have not been tabulated. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Focusing on the two different effects that CEO compensation incentives have on corporate investment strategies, the 
incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, we examine the relationship between CEO compensation 
incentives and corporate tax avoidance strategy. CEO compensation incentives are generally known to induce CEOs 
to maximize firm value via various methods, one possibly being the reduction of tax expense. However, CEOs under 
very high levels of compensation incentives may be overly conservative on risk-taking and may avoid positive NPV 
projects that are risky. With the view that tax avoidance strategies may entail risk, we predict that the tax avoidance 
strategies of CEOs with high levels of compensation incentives will be different from those of CEOs with low levels 
of compensation incentives. 
 
Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between the CEO compensation incentives and tax 
avoidance, we document that the risk-reducing effect at high levels of CEO incentives causes the relation to be non-
linear. Compensation incentives, such as stocks and options, are intended to align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders, thereby inducing managers to reduce costs and increase bottom line income. Although this incentive 
alignment effect leads managers to lower tax costs, the findings of this study further show that CEOs reduce the risky 
component of tax avoidance strategy and bear paying more taxes beyond a certain level of compensation incentives. 
In addition, we find that the non-linear relation does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. As S&P500 firms 
are large, profitable, and likely to be under greater news coverage, they are expected to have a high level of ex ante 
reputational concerns, which constrains them from taking risky tax avoidance strategies. This finding suggests that 
the reputational risk concern may deter risky tax avoidance activities. 
 
The findings of this study add to the literature that examines the determinants of tax-avoidance (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon 
& Maydew, 2008; Rego & Wilson, 2012). Although CEO compensation incentives have been extensively studied as 
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being one of the many determinants of corporate tax avoidance, we provide a new perspective into the relation between 
CEO compensation incentives and tax avoidance based on two counter effective forces – the incentive alignment effect 
and the risk reducing effect. These findings are expected to inform regulators, academicians, and managers about the 
negative effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance under the high level of compensation incentives. 
 
A possible future extension of this study is to find the reflection point regarding the relation between CEO 
compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. Although this paper provides evidence of a hump-shaped 
relation between CEO compensation incentives and tax avoidance, the reflection point where the slope of the relation 
turns from a positive sign to a negative sign cannot be provided explicitly, as this point depends on other fundamental 
characteristics of the firm. We hope that future research can provide the reflection point explicitly with a more refined 
setting.  
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APPENDIX A. Variable measurement 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Tax Avoidance 
CASH_ETR 3-year cash effective tax rate, measured as the sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by the sum of total pre-tax income (PI), multiplied by (-1). 
BTD 
Difference between book income and tax income, measured as pre-tax income (PI) minus the 
sum of grossed up current federal and foreign tax expense (TXFED+TXFO), less change in 
tax loss carry forward (TLCF), scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
DTAX 
Residual from the following regression estimated by year and two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code: 
 
PERMDIFFit = α0 + α1(1/ATit−1) + α2INTANGit 
+ α3UNCONit + α4MIit + α5CSTEit + α6∆NOLit 
+ α7LAGPERMit + εit 
where: 
 
PERMDIFF = Total book-tax differences – temporary book-tax differences = [{PI–
[(TXFED+TXFO)/STR]}–(TXDI/STR)], scaled by beginning of year assets (AT); STR = 
Statutory tax rate; INTANG = Goodwill and other intangibles (INTAN) divided by total 
assets at year t–1; UNCON = Income (loss) reported under the equity method (ESUB) divided 
by total assets at year t–1; MI = Income (loss) attributable to minority interest(MII), scaled 
by beginning of year assets (AT); CSTE = Current state tax expense (TXS), scaled by 
beginning of year assets; ∆NOL = Change in net operating loss carry forwards (TLCF), 
scaled by beginning of year assets (AT); LAGPERM =PERMDIFF in year t–1. 
Other variables 
CEO_INC Natural log of the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio ($1mil.).  
VEGA The sensitivity of the change in wealth for a 1% change in stock return volatility ($1mil.) (see Coles et al. [2013]). 
SIZE Natural log of total assets (AT). 
LEV Total debt (DLTT + DLC) scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
FI Foreign income (PIFO) scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
PPE Net property and equipment (PPENT) scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
CAP_EXP Capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
RND Research and development expense (XRD) scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
MB Market value of equity (CSHO x PRCC_F), scaled by book value of equity (CEQ). 
ROA Pretax income (PI), scaled by beginning of year total assets (AT). 
NOL Net operating loss indicator variable = 1 if firm i has net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) available at the beginning of year t, and 0 otherwise. 
